23dc49c3-542c-4ee4-a911-ab8e06ffebf720260404123242Ubiquity Presstech@ubiquitypress.comRUA Metadata ExporterKatriPynnöniemiUniversity of Helsinki and National Defence Universityhttps://ror.org/04mmq3h75Aleksanteri-institute and Department of Art of Warhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-6123-1206A Quest for Internal CohesionThis edited volume explores patriotism and the growing role of militarism in today’s Russia. During the last 20-year period, there has been a consistent effort in Russia to consolidate the nation and to foster a sense of unity and common purpose. To this end, Russian authorities have activated various channels, from educational programmes and youth organizations to media and popular culture. With the conflict in Ukraine, the manipulation of public sentiments – feeling of pride and perception of threat – has become more systemic. The traditional view of Russia being Other for Europe has been replaced with a narrative of enmity. The West is portrayed as a threat to Russia’s historical-cultural originality while Russia represents itself as a country encircled by enemies. On the other hand, these state-led projects mixing patriotism and militarism are perceived sceptically by the Russian society, especially the younger generations. This volume provides new insights into the evolution of enemy images in Russia and the ways in which societal actors perceive official projections of patriotism and militarism in the Russian society. The contributors of the volume include several experts on Russian studies, contemporary history, political science, sociology, and media studies. Katri Pynnöniemi holds a joint professorship of Russian security studies at the University of Helsinki and at the Finnish National Defense University. She has published widely on the system change in Russia as well as on Russian foreign and security policy. The contributors of the volume include several experts on Russian studies, contemporary history, political science, sociology, and media studies.This volume provides new insights into the evolution of enemy images in Russia and the ways in which societal actors perceive official projections of patriotism and militarism in the country. When analysing the trajectory of Russia’s foreign policy and the transformation of society in general, patriotism and the growing role of militarism are the key variables. The book provides a nuanced understanding of the nexus between these two and critically evaluates their implications for the Russian domestic development and foreign policy.05272021978-952-369-034-9978-952-369-035-6978-952-369-036-3978-952-369-037-0Helsinki University PressHelsinkihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/10.33134/HUP-9https://hup.fi/books/e/10.33134/HUP-9https://hup.fi/books/14/files/3dd9e68e-6dc1-41df-9072-2b7df0d456a0.pdfhttps://hup.fi/books/14/files/3dd9e68e-6dc1-41df-9072-2b7df0d456a0.pdfKatriPynnöniemiUniversity of Helsinki and National Defence Universityhttps://ror.org/04mmq3h75Aleksanteri-institute and Department of Art of Warhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-6123-12060527202110.33134/HUP-9-1https://hup.fi/chapters/e/10.33134/HUP-9-1https://hup.fi/books/14/files/65f88cd6-edcf-4436-9398-ae40077bbd5f.pdfKatiParppeiUniversity of Eastern Finlandhttps://ror.org/00cyydd11Department of Geographical and Historical StudiesHistorical contextualizing is essential to examining and understanding the forms of patriotism and applications of national narrative in contemporary Russia. An important aspect in the formation of collective identities are the perceptions of outer threat at any given time. In this chapter, certain aspects of the development of enemy images in Russia are briefly studied and contextualized, followed by an examination of their manifestations in the contemporary Russian politicization of history.0527202110.33134/HUP-9-2https://hup.fi/chapters/e/10.33134/HUP-9-2https://hup.fi/books/14/files/bf20de86-fc11-4180-8413-3096e58492b1.pdfVeeraLaineFinnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) / University of Helsinkihttps://ror.org/02qpcpw42EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood and Russia research programme / Political historyhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-3990-1714In this chapter, the Others of Russia, reoccurring in the presidential discourse in 2000–2020, will be analysed. The key speeches reveal three distinctive ‘Others’ of the Russian state and nation, evolving in space and time: first, an ineffective politician in the 1990s, and, later, a corrupt bureaucrat, is framed as historical and internal Other, whose figure legitimizes the current power. Second, the metaphor of constant competition in the international relations describes the Other as economically stronger developed Western country, against which Russia’s ‘backwardness’ is mirrored, especially in the early 2000s. As the economic competition becomes harder to win and the quest for national unity intensifies, the emphasis turns to the third Other, the one holding fundamentally different values than the Self. Thus, it is argued that the metaphor of competition/conflict between Russia and its Others has undergone a qualitative transformation in the presidential rhetoric, reflecting change in Russia’s relative strength: instead of the previously admired economic performance, the times of conflict show that Russia’s true strength vis-à-vis its Others resides in the conservative, moral values and military might.0527202110.33134/HUP-9-3https://hup.fi/chapters/e/10.33134/HUP-9-3https://hup.fi/books/14/files/a37ecddb-e19c-4b6d-893e-4f5577502138.pdfKatriPynnöniemiUniversity of Helsinki and National Defence Universityhttps://ror.org/04mmq3h75Aleksanteri-institute and Department of Art of Warhttps://orcid.org/0000-0001-6123-1206Enemy images can be thought of as scripts that articulate a logic of enmity and identify a source of threat towards the Self. In this chapter, Russian émigré philosopher Ivan Ilʹin’s identification of Russia’s enemies are used as a reference point in the analysis of the Kremlin’s strategic communication of threats. The analysis of Ilʹin’s enemy images and their juxtaposition with the Kremlin’s strategic communication of threats opens up three different but complementary scripts that explain threats and risks for Russia’s state security.0527202110.33134/HUP-9-4https://hup.fi/chapters/e/10.33134/HUP-9-4https://hup.fi/books/14/files/6a4dd484-6e79-4b8e-ae3d-bca48b2e6e42.pdfJussiLassilaFinnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)https://ror.org/02qpcpw42https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5966-2947The chapter discusses patriotism’s role and future prospects in Russia in relation to its principal target, Russia’s youth. Beneath the overall conformism with the Kremlin’s patriotic policies, youth’s relatively marginal engagement with any fixed patriotic identity is to be found among a variety of patriotic activists who prefer a distinct patriotic position to the state and the rest of society. In generational terms, Russia is witnessing a deepening gap between the policymakers of patriotism and the youth. On the one hand, the state repeatedly attempts to strengthen patriotism as an ideological tool in controlling societal and cultural processes, while, on the other hand, youth’s departing views from Soviet-like modes of patriotic education ignite demands to increase the role of patriotism further. Over the course of the next 10–15 years, it is very likely that an change in the balance between Soviet-era and post-Soviet cohorts of policymakers and conductors of patriotic policies will have a significant impact on the role and meaning of patriotism in Russian society.0527202110.33134/HUP-9-5https://hup.fi/chapters/e/10.33134/HUP-9-5https://hup.fi/books/14/files/4e928b7e-bd31-461d-86ad-bbb8a76c921b.pdfEemilMitikkaUniversity of Helsinki, Faculty of Artshttps://ror.org/040af2s02Aleksanteri Institutehttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-0784-261XMargaritaZavadskayaUniversity of Helsinki, Faculty of Artshttps://ror.org/040af2s02Aleksanteri institutehttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-3728-4073Since the early 2000s, the Kremlin has sought to make patriotism an overarching national ideology for Russia. In recent years, the state-promoted patriotism has become increasingly militaristic and the external threats have been more and more emphasized in the Kremlin’s discourse. At the same time, some streams of literature suggest that the majority of Russians have actually embraced the state’s vision of militaristic patriotism and the regime-promoted idea of strong political leadership over a democratic rule. Drawing on previous research and fresh and nationally representative survey data, we examine how public perceptions of patriotism relate to the state-promoted patriotism and preference for political authoritarian leadership in contemporary Russia. Our results indicate that while the Kremlin-promoted militaristic component of patriotism has slightly increased among the Russian public after the political events of 2014, it still differs from the state-imposed patriotism in many ways and remains more diverse across Russian society. Furthermore, the notion of patriotism in the mass opinion has remained by and large the same despite the ‘rallying around the flag’ after the annexation of Crimea in 2014.0527202110.33134/HUP-9-6https://hup.fi/chapters/e/10.33134/HUP-9-6https://hup.fi/books/14/files/65853606-a9e6-45ab-845f-128ba2b1c0e0.pdfSallaNazarenkoTampere Universityhttps://ror.org/033003e23Communication SciencesThis chapter analyses patriotic discourses of Russian television journalists. The starting point is that there is a certain pressure to be patriotic imposed upon journalists who work for mainstream television. Three discourses on patriotism have been identified through thematic interviews: a personal, intimate patriotism; a militaristic one -  and  a patriotism that draws from the narratives of ongoing information war. Russian journalists use all three discourses when they explain their attitude towards patriotism. While journalists express criticism towards militaristic undertones of official discourse, the most prominent figures in television accept and repeat it in their work.0527202110.33134/HUP-9-7https://hup.fi/chapters/e/10.33134/HUP-9-7https://hup.fi/books/14/files/c422d98d-ea9a-4334-b48c-cc14f435ebb2.pdfArseniySvynarenkoUniversity of TampereFaculty of Social Scienceshttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-5602-7240The demographic trends and general general scepticism among the youth towards the armed forces have created a strong impetus for the authorities to make military service more attractive to young Russian men. This chapter will provide an overview of the newly organized military-political training among the conscripts and military personnel.0527202110.33134/HUP-9-8https://hup.fi/chapters/e/10.33134/HUP-9-8https://hup.fi/books/14/files/12737208-cbf6-46e3-9a57-17153578bb17.pdfJonnaAlavaUniversity of Helsinkihttps://ror.org/040af2s02Faculty of Artshttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-0793-8256This chapter addresses military-patriotic education in Russia. The Russian state pays increasing attention to the military-patriotic upbringing of children to elevate patriotic spirit in society and to get a larger number of motivated young men join the armed forces. In 2015, Ûnarmiâ was founded to unite the country’s fragmented military-patriotic youth organisations. The movement aims to operate in all schools in Russia. By deconstructing the hegemonic discourse of military-patriotic education, I analyse the linguistic modes in which the legitimization of Ûnarmiâ is constructed. Discourses of heroism, masculinity, a beneficial and fun hobby, being citizen-soldiers, and military traditionalism include key strategies of legitimization processes for influencing audiences. Discourses suggest that rather than preparing young people for immediate war, Ûnarmiâ's purpose is to raise patriotic citizens who support the prevailing regime and contribute to solving the demographic crisis by repeating ‘traditional’ gender roles.”0527202110.33134/HUP-9-9https://hup.fi/chapters/e/10.33134/HUP-9-9https://hup.fi/books/14/files/67fcceb4-fc59-4d72-b6ed-b04c36bf6adb.pdfElinaKahlaUniversity of Helsinkihttps://ror.org/040af2s02Aleksanteri Institutehttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-9473-8158This chapter addresses church-state collaboration in the context of ‘spiritual national defence’; it compares different views represented in cultural productions on the tragedy of the submarine Kursk, that which sank in the Barents Sea, on 12 August 2000. It suggests that the Russian secular leadership’s reluctance to deal with the management of the past, especially concerning the punishment of Stalinist oppressors, is compensated by glorifying victims – here, the seamen of the Kursk – having died on duty, as martyrs. Тhe glorification of martyrs derives from Old Testament theology of blood sacrifice (2 Moses, 24:8), and makes it possible to commemorate Muslim martyrs together with Orthodox Christian ones. Some theologians have claimed that Russia had needed these sacrifices to spiritually wake up in the post-atheist vacuum of values, and that the Russian people had to repent for having abandoned their forefathers’ Christian faith. In this line of apologetics of blood sacrifices and need to repent, the New Testament’s promise of Jesus’s complete purgation and redemption of sin through perfect sacrifice (Matt. 26:28) is not mentioned. My reading elaborates on the commemorative album Everlasting Lamp of Kursk by (then) Hegumen Mitrofan (Badanin) (2010), as well as on the drama film Kursk by Danish director Thomas Vinterberg (2018), whose film illustrates pan-European visions, based implicitly on the New Testament promise.0527202110.33134/HUP-9-10https://hup.fi/chapters/e/10.33134/HUP-9-10https://hup.fi/books/14/files/5d8beba5-4a8b-4d0b-aaff-61f1e69bf5a1.pdfKatriPynnöniemiUniversity of Helsinki and National Defence Universityhttps://ror.org/04mmq3h75https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6123-12060527202110.33134/HUP-9-11https://hup.fi/chapters/e/10.33134/HUP-9-11https://hup.fi/books/14/files/06a7ef5f-e223-4c84-8c0a-7484bb4feec5.pdf